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Introduction 
 On November 22, 2014, Tamir Rice, a 12-year-old black boy, was shot by a white 
police officer in a park outside a Cleveland recreation center. A witness had called 911 to 
report that Rice was wielding what appeared to be a pistol, but turned out to be a plastic 
pellet gun he had won in a trade with a friend.1 Security footage of the scene shows Rice 
playing in the snow and sitting on a bench in a gazebo before the police arrive. When the 
cruiser pulls up, Rice stands. Two officers exit the car with their guns drawn and within 
seconds the boy falls, disappearing behind the car.2 
  In the moments leading up to and following the shooting, witnesses in the park 
and police officers who arrived at the scene struggled to discern Rice’s age. The witness 
who called 911 to report the gun described Rice to the dispatcher as a black “guy,” 
“probably a juvenile.” He also acknowledged that the pistol was “probably fake,” but 
concluded, “It’s scaring the shit out of me.”3 In a subsequent interview, he estimated the 
boy’s age to be 18, adding, “[Rice] was being a gangster. He kept reaching in his crotch.” 
The police officers who reported to the scene appear to have made a similar 
misjudgment. In the radio transmission immediately following the shooting, the 
accompanying officer reported, “Shots fired! Male down. Um, black male, maybe 20 
[years old].”4  
																																																						
1 Emma Fitzsimmons, “12-Year-Old Boy Dies After Police in Cleveland Shoot Him,” 
New York Times, November 23, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/us/boy-12-
dies-after-being-shot-by-cleveland-police-officer.html. 
2 “Tamir Rice: police release video of 12-year-old’s fatal shooting,” Guardian, November 
26, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2014/nov/26/cleveland-video-
tamir-rice-shooting-police. 
3 Lamar Sims, Cuyahoga County Office of the Prosecutor, October 6, 2015, 5. 
4 Ibid., 7. 
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 In an expert report on the shooting, Denver Senior Chief Deputy District Attorney 
Lamar Sims notes that only one witness to whom Rice was unknown estimated the boy’s 
age accurately. Rice’s body, he explains, was misleading: “Rice was 5’7” and 195 lbs,” 
and thus any “reasonable officer responding to the call would have believed Rice was an 
older teen or young adult.”5 He ultimately concludes that, given the apparent ambiguity 
of Rice’s age, the officer’s judgment that the boy posed a serious threat was “objectively 
reasonable, as was his response to that perceived threat.”6 
 Rice died the following day from his wounds. In an interview with The New York 
Times, the family’s lawyer declared that “the shooting did not appear to have anything to 
do with race.” He insisted that “the important question was why the officers did not act 
with more caution because they were dealing with a child.”7 But Rice’s shooting and the 
desperate attempts before and after the incident to read the boy’s body and behavior for 
age demonstrate the extent to which race and childhood are entwined in American 
society. The two are, in fact, inseparable. Questions of what it means to be a child in 
America—what a child looks like and acts like—are integral to questions of what it 
means to be black in America, and vice versa.  
 This thesis will grapple with these questions, examining the history of race and 
childhood as mutually constructed categories in nineteenth and twentieth century 
American literary and visual culture. Rice’s shooting occurred in the wake of similar 
incidents, such as the killings of 17-year-old Trayvon Martin in 2012 and 18-year-old 
Michael Brown in 2014, and in the midst of a reinvigorated debate about the 
																																																						
5 Ibid., 13. 
6 Ibid., 14. 
7 Fitzsimmons, “12-Year-Old Boy Dies.”  
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criminalization of black boys in the United States. I plan to explore the interrelationship 
of race and childhood with these tragedies in mind, considering the following questions: 
How has modern American culture constructed a narrative of childhood that excludes 
non-white, and in particular black, children? How does this narrative distribute innocence 
and vulnerability along racial lines? Who is included, in Jennifer Tilton’s terms, in the 
“category and protections of childhood?”8 
 Rather than focus on the lived experience of racialized childhood, I am interested 
in the process and purpose of racialization. That is, how is childhood constructed in racial 
terms in American literary and visual culture? What emotional and political burdens do 
children bear in discourses around race, and how did children become crucial to these 
discourses in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries? In other words, how is childhood 
politically useful? 
 
Outline 
Answers to these questions trace through the nineteenth century, where my study begins. 
My first chapter will examine the history of childhood in the nineteenth century and the 
historically located, if seemingly natural, associations between childhood and innocence 
and childhood and suffering. These associations emerged in part from material changes in 
the lived experience of childhood and in part, as I will show, from cultural texts that 
constructed and popularized a racialized ideal of childhood. I will focus on one such text, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe’s 1852 novel, Uncle Tom’s Cabin, which centers children in its 
																																																						
8 Jennifer Tilton, Dangerous or Endangered? Race and the Politics of Youth in Urban 
America, (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 162. 
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discussion of race and slavery. While Stowe formulated a construction of childhood that 
was fundamentally raced white, she also connected childhood innocence and suffering to 
the pain of slaves and, in doing so, worked to include black children in the category of 
childhood. 
 By the turn-of-the-century, this was no longer the case: mainstream popular 
culture had consolidated a racist construction of childhood that broadly excluded black 
children. My second chapter will follow this transformation, examining how mass culture 
bore witness to debates around race and rights in a post-slavery era and, importantly, 
centered children in these efforts. I will pay particular attention to the emergence of the 
caricature of the “pickaninny”—the non-child, animalistic, violent, and immune to 
pain—in popular visual culture. As Robin Bernstein has argued, “pain, and the ability to 
feel it . . . is what divided white childhood from black childhood,” and what excluded 
black children from the category of childhood in the popular imagination.9 
 My final chapter will explore how mid- and late-twentieth-century black writers 
and activists grappled with and resisted the legacy of this racist construction of 
childhood. I will pay particular attention to Toni Morrison’s 1970 novel, The Bluest Eye. 
In many ways, Morrison followed in the tradition of civil rights activists who positioned 
black children as victims of a racist system. However, she also deconstructed the idea of 
childhood all together, revealing the extent to which hegemonic constructions of 
childhood were raced white. In marking, or “re-racializing” whiteness, Morrison worked 
to disrupt and disempower white supremacist constructions of childhood. 
																																																						
9 Robin Bernstein, Racial Innocence: Performing American Childhood from Slavery to 
Civil Rights, (New York: New York University Press, 2011), 35. 
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 My intention is not to write a comprehensive history of race and childhood in 
American culture, but rather to examine particular historical moments in which the two 
categories intersect. I argue that race and childhood are mutually constructed phenomena. 
In other words, not only is childhood constructed in racial terms (in particular, as being 
white), but childhood is also a crucial site upon which race is constructed. The centrality 
of children to Uncle Tom’s Cabin, for instance, demonstrates the rhetorical power of 
childhood. Stowe’s Topsy and Eva mediate the violence of slavery. They are victims of a 
system beyond their control, bearing the emotional burden of a national struggle over 
race and rights, over what it means to be a citizen and what it means to be human. 
Put differently, I am interested in the intersectionality of race and childhood. Over 
the past several decades, social science and humanities scholarship has embraced the 
concept of intersectionality to focus attention on the way individuals’ identities are 
shaped by a combination of race, class, and gender and to understand the way these 
categories achieve meaning through their interactions with one another. This framework 
is especially useful for thinking about childhood: constructions of childhood—notions of 
what children look like and act like—gain legibility through the signifier of race. 
Importantly, class and gender are both deeply involved in the construction and 
racialization of childhood. When witnesses of Tamir Rice’s shooting alleged that he was 
acting like a “gangster,” they read both his race and his gender for signs of criminality 
and danger. Likewise, when Victorian readers wept over Little Eva’s death, they 
mourned the loss not just of her childhood but of her middle-class girlhood. That being 
said, the relationships between childhood, gender, and class will not be the focus of this 
	 7 
study. I am concerned specifically with how childhood secures its meaning through race 
and vice versa. 
 
Race and Childhood as Constructions 
Central to my project is the understanding that both race and childhood are constructions. 
I am in no sense denying their reality as lived experiences. Rather, I am treating them 
both as categories that carry historically specific social and emotional meanings. Neither 
is essential; neither is fixed. While such understandings of race have become a fixture in 
academia over the last several decades, a social constructivist doctrine of childhood has 
been slower to coalesce. French historian Philippe Ariés was the first to posit childhood 
as an historical phenomenon, arguing, in his landmark 1960 book, Centuries of 
Childhood, that childhood—as distinct from adulthood—was an invention of the 
European Enlightenment. Although sociologists and historians following Ariés have 
generally accepted childhood as a construction, Karen Sánchez-Eppler points out that 
“the social history of children remains far scantier than that of virtually any other 
demographic group.”10 Children are seen foremost as private beings, objects of study for 
psychological development but not for social meaning. 
 
The Political Usefulness of Childhood 
I argue, in contrast, that children are crucial to our national imagination—that characters 
like Topsy and Eva have powerful political potential because they are children. As Karín 
																																																						
10 Karen Sánchez-Eppler, Dependent States: The Child’s Part in Nineteenth-Century 
American Culture, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), xv. 
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Lesnik-Oberstein notes, the child’s centrality to discourses of “power, freedom, nature, 
innocence, sexuality, and hope” reveal “the entrenchment of the imagery” of childhood.11 
There are several reasons for this. As James Kincaid writes, “Childhood can be made a 
wonderfully hollow category, able to be filled up with anyone’s overflowing  
emotions. . . .”12 Thus, children are uniquely positioned to bear the emotional and 
political burdens of adults—children can carry their “overflowing emotions.” But this 
quality reveals a crucial paradox underlying our conceptions of childhood. On the one 
hand, childhood is a constructed category, “wonderfully hollow” and open to changing 
social meaning. This instability makes it politically useful: children are easily implicated 
in political discourses. They can be made to argue for or against slavery, for or against 
civil rights. As Ala Alryyes explains, the abstract child carries distinct symbolic power: 
“children represent both the promise of and resistance to continuity.”13 They are 
determinants of the future, and thus their stories “allegorize national victimization and 
‘hope.’”14 Childhood is symbolic and malleable and thus highly usable.  
 On the other hand, however, childhood is politically powerful because it resists 
these characterizations: it is imagined to be perfectly stable and natural. While 
sociologists insist on the child’s constructed status, most writers, like Stowe, insist on the 
child’s reality. Because children are understood to be essentially apolitical beings, moral 
and emotional rather than social, their political work appears depoliticized. According to 
																																																						
11 Karín Lesnik-Oberstein, Children’s Literature: Criticism and the Fictional Child, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 29.  
12 James Kincaid, Child-loving: The Erotic Child and Victorian Culture, (London: 
Routledge, 1992), 12, ACLS Humanities E-Book. 
13 Ala Alryyes, Original Subjects: The Child, the Novel, and the Nation, (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2001), 15. 
14 Ibid., 208. 
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Sánchez-Eppler, “Recourse to the imagery of childhood usually masks the institutional 
and structural forces at work—the evocation of childhood making proscriptions appear 
‘natural.’”15 When Little Eva befriends Uncle Tom, she is ignorant of the structures of 
racism that prescribe their segregation; she is acting on an innocent impulse. Her 
expression of racial goodwill is childish and natural rather than overtly political.  
  
On Agency 
While historical and sociological studies of children have traditionally treated children as 
objects—passive recipients of adult culture—scholars in recent years have made 
important moves to recast children as social and political actors. For instance, feminist 
sociologist Barrie Thorne has argued that feminist theory should incorporate children’s 
experiences and perspectives to challenge its normative adult-centered framework, much 
in the way that feminists have challenged male-centered frameworks, and to grant 
children conceptual agency, much in the way that feminists have worked to grant women 
agency.16 To this end, a great deal of work has been done in sociology and history to 
refocus children as subjects.17  
 For the purposes of my study, however, I am interested in children as objects. My 
intention is not to deny children agency or to discount them as important political actors. 
But in thinking about the political usefulness of imagined children—that is, Stowe’s Eva 
or Morrison’s Claudia—the more relevant question becomes: when in American culture 
																																																						
15 Sánchez-Eppler, Dependent States, xxiii. 
16 Barrie Thorne, “Re-Visioning Women and Social Change: Where are the Children?,” 
Gender and Society 1, no. 1 (1987): 86. 
17 Sánchez-Eppler, Dependent States, xvii. 
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are children constructed as objects, when are they constructed as subjects, and what does 
this mean? In this approach I am following Jacqueline Rose, who argues in her classic 
study of Peter Pan that cultural representations of childhood are fundamentally 
expressions of adult desires: they reveal more about the imperatives of adults than about 
the lived reality of childhood.18 While Stowe tends to construct her child characters as 
objects—bodies onto which the horrors of slavery are inscribed—Morrison is concerned 
with granting her children agency. Indeed, Morrison’s resistance to racist constructions of 
childhood depends on the subjectivity of her black girl characters.  
 
Black Self-Representation  
It is important to note that Morrison follows a long tradition of black writers writing 
black childhood. In the years preceding and following the publication of Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin former slaves produced slave narratives recounting their stories, often focusing 
heavily on their childhoods. Frederick Douglass’s 1845 Narrative of the Life of Frederick 
Douglass, an American Slave, for instance, told of his separation from his mother at an 
early age, his struggle to learn to read, and his coming of age under the harsh regime of a 
cruel overseer. Similarly, Harriet Jacobs’s powerful 1861 Incidents in the Life of a Slave 
Girl recounted her prolonged sexual abuse, beginning in childhood, at the hands of her 
master. Although they were always published with help from white abolitionists and 
often edited, these accounts offer a crucial glimpse of childhood in bondage and an early 
																																																						
18 Jacqueline Rose, The Case of Peter Pan, or, The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction, 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993), 2. 
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example of African American self-representation. Like Morrison’s writing a century 
later, these narratives centered the subjectivity of the black child. 
 Although my study is primarily concerned with black self-representation in the 
latter half of the twentieth century, I am in no sense discounting the importance of these 
earlier works. Rather, I am interested in understanding how hegemonic culture in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries racialized childhood, and how black writers and 
activists in the late twentieth century grappled with and resisted the legacy of this 
construction. Although Douglass and Jacobs are prominent in contemporary historical 
scholarship, they were largely excluded from dominant discourses around race and 
slavery until the 1960s and ‘70s. While abolitionism in no sense constituted mainstream 
culture, Uncle Tom’s Cabin was perhaps the most read book in the nineteenth century, 
after the Bible, and holds a powerful place in American cultural memory. Importantly, it 
helped to establish childhood as a central part of the American racial imagination. 
Likewise, popular visual culture at the turn of the century, which was mainstream culture, 
worked to consolidate and cement a hegemonic narrative of American childhood that 
excluded black children. It was in the context of this narrative that African American 
writers and activists in the second half of the twentieth century turned to childhood as a 
site of resistance.  
 
The “Protections” of Childhood 
Throughout this thesis I pose the question: “Who is included in the category and 
protections of childhood?” The assumption behind this question—that childhood, as 
distinct from all other phases of life, carries with it certain protections—is worth 
	 12 
unpacking. As I will argue in the first chapter, since the nineteenth century childhood has 
maintained a “sacralized” status in American culture: children are invested with 
emotional and sentimental meaning; they are understood to be special. And because 
childhood is sacred, it is also protected. An affront to the sanctity of childhood represents, 
in Viviana Zelizer’s terms, “an intolerable sacrilege.”19 When the Rice family lawyer 
wondered “why the officers did not act with more caution because they were dealing with 
a child,” he was posing a seemingly simple question: why did Tamir Rice’s childhood not 
protect him from violence and death? This thesis will examine the historical and cultural 
formation of “sacred” childhood and the process by which black children, like Rice, were 
removed this category’s protections.
																																																						
19 Viviana Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child: The Changing Social Value of Children, 
(New York: Basic Books, 1985), 23. 
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Chapter 1: Uncle Tom’s Cabin and the Sentimental Child 
 In 1863, in the midst of the Civil War, a popular carte de visite (Figure 1) of a 
young slave girl began circulating among northern households. The small photograph 
featured Fannie Lawrence, a five-year-old slave who had been “redeemed in Virginia” 
and baptized by abolitionist Henry Ward Beecher (Harriet Beecher Stowe’s brother). 
Fannie is adorned in an elaborate dress and perched on the arm of a chair, holding a 
bouquet of flowers. Notably, she appears to have white skin.  
  
 
 
The popularity of Fannie’s image prompted another series of abolitionist cartes de visite 
of so-called “white slaves” the next year. While this series included some dark-skinned 
Figure 1. Portrait of Fannie Lawrence. 
Carte de visite (1863). Library of Congress. 
Figure 2. “Rosa, A Slave Girl from New 
Orleans.” Carte de visite (1864). Library of 
Congress. 
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subjects, the majority of the cartes featured only the whitest-looking children—usually 
girls.20 
 The children in these photographs both captivated and disturbed northern 
audiences. As Mary Mitchell explains, the images “were spectacles with multiple 
meanings, inviting a combination of sympathy, speculation, voyeurism, and moral 
outrage.”21  The subjects’ white skin compelled the viewers to acknowledge a likeness to 
them, to sympathize and perhaps even to identify with them. The picture of Rosa, for 
instance, resembled typical portraits of white middle-class girls: rendered in vignette, 
only her head and the top of her white dress are visible, and she is surrounded by soft, 
white light, approximating the color of her skin. The style makes her look like an angel, 
accentuating her virtue and, above all, her whiteness. Her portrait appealed to 
sentimentalized notions of childhood innocence that, by midcentury, predominated white 
middle-class ideology. That this child, who so closely resembled a white Victorian girl, 
could have been born a slave signaled to white northerners that “not only freedom but 
virtue was at stake.”22  
 But these photographs also troubled viewers: they appealed to pervasive fears 
about white enslavement and unsettled notions of determinate racial difference. Indeed, 
what disturbed contemporary viewers most was that these young girls, who looked 
“perfectly white,” were in fact not.23 As Mitchell notes, by encouraging viewers to 
identify with white-looking slaves, “white slave” propaganda may have unintentionally 
																																																						
20 Mary Niall Mitchell, “‘Rosebloom and Pure White,’ or so It Seemed,” American 
Quarterly 54, no. 3 (September 2002): 370, jhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/30042226. 
21 Ibid., 373. 
22 Ibid., 376. 
23 Mitchell, “‘Rosebloom and Pure White,’” 373. 
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exacerbated white anxieties about the dangers of emancipation: they hinted at a post-
emancipation future where racial difference was indeterminate, where white skin no 
longer necessarily conferred power and privilege. 24 
 Crucially, these photographs negotiated complicated questions of race and rights 
by centering children as their subjects. This strategy is not incidental: by the mid-
nineteenth century, childhood had achieved a sanctified status in American culture. The 
unprecedented popularity of Uncle Tom’s Cabin a decade earlier exemplifies the 
preeminence of Victorian childhood: Stowe uses her child characters to navigate 
complicated political terrain. In both the photographs and the novel, children’s bodies 
mediate the violence of slavery and the struggle for rights. This chapter will explore the 
context in which, by midcentury, childhood became a crucial site of these racial 
discourses.  
 I will begin by tracing the historical origins of the sentimental construction of 
childhood, considering the requisites for childhood that this construction entailed: 
economic uselessness, sexual and racial innocence, and pain and suffering. Finally, I will 
examine how Stowe’s phenomenally popular text both reflected and actively shaped 
racialized constructions of childhood in the mid-nineteenth century. While the novel 
helped to institutionalize a construction of childhood that was fundamentally raced white, 
it also connected childhood innocence and suffering to the pain of slaves. In other words, 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin protested slavery by working to include black children in the 
category and protections of childhood. 
 
																																																						
24 Ibid., 373, 379. 
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A History of Childhood  
Over the course of the nineteenth century, the meaning of childhood in the United States 
underwent dramatic changes: children were increasingly treated as distinct from adults 
and were valued for their emotional rather than economic labor. Childhood became 
defined as a state of holy innocence and supreme vulnerability: to be a child was to be 
pure and, often, to suffer. Most of all, though, to be a child was to be white. 
 In part, these changes in the conceptualization of childhood emerged from broader 
social and economic transformations. As Mary Lynn Stevens Heininger notes, at the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, most children of white, middle-class families lived 
in rural areas, worked to contribute to the family income, and passed from childhood into 
adulthood relatively quickly.25 Over the course of the century, technological 
advancements made areas like the Northeast increasingly industrial, urban, and 
commercial.26 At the same time, social reformers concerned about the effects of these 
changes committed to making public education a reality for all non-slave children. By 
1860, over half of the nation’s children were receiving some sort of formal education.27 
By 1897, most states had passed effective compulsory education laws.28 At the turn of the 
twentieth century, the majority of American children lived in towns and cities and 
																																																						
25 Mary Lynn Steven Heininger, “Children, Childhood, and Change in America, 1820-
1920,” in A Century of Childhood 1820-1920, (Rochester: Margaret Woodbury Strong 
Museum, 1984), 1. 
26 Ibid., 3. 
27 Heininger, “Children, Childhood, and Change in America,” 10. 
28 Barbara Finkelstein and Kathy Vandell, “The Schooling of American Childhood: The 
Emergence of Learning Communities, 1820-1920,” in A Century of Childhood 1820-
1920, (Rochester: Margaret Woodbury Strong Museum, 1984), 85. 
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attended school instead of working. This exclusion of children from the workforce 
prolonged childhood as a period of life distinct from working adulthood.29 
 It also changed what childhood meant. Viviana Zelizer argues that between the 
mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, children shifted from being economically 
productive members of their families to “economically useless but emotionally 
priceless.”30 This shift was partly, as Heininger maintains, a result of “profound changes 
in the economic, occupational, and family structures” wrought by child labor laws and 
the introduction of compulsory education.31 As children were excluded from the 
economic sphere and located increasingly in the home, the middle-class American family 
became more domestic, with the child as its emotional core. 
 However, this shift was also symptomatic of broader changes in the cultural 
valuation of childhood. Zelizer maintains that, over the course of the nineteenth century, 
children were “sacralized.” As their work became primarily emotional, rather than 
economic, they became “objects invested with sentimental or religious meaning.”32 
Zelizer argues that the public concern for infant and child mortality at the end of the 
nineteenth century and the magnification of mourning for child death in the twentieth 
century marked a new understanding of childhood: “If child life was sacred, child death 
became an intolerable sacrilege, provoking not only parental sorrow but social 
bereavement as well.”33 Children had become “emotionally priceless.” 
																																																						
29 Heininger, “Children, Childhood, and Change in America,” 1. 
30 Zelizer, Pricing the Priceless Child, 3. 
31 Ibid., 11. 
32 Ibid., 11. 
33 Ibid., 23. 
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 While this vision of sacralized childhood took form in the mid-nineteenth century, 
it roots back to the mid- to late-eighteenth century. As Jacqueline Reinier explains, 
following the Revolutionary War, “adults focused on the child in an unprecedented way.” 
In the early years of the Republic, children held enormous political power: “Perhaps the 
malleable child of enlightened thought could be molded into the virtuous, autonomous 
citizen.”34 The writings of John Locke, who theorized that children were “blank slates” 
upon which parental and state authority could write, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who 
theorized that children were innocent by nature, dominated middle-class child-rearing in 
the period and marked a shift in the cultural value of childhood: children were 
meaningful because they could determine the future of the new nation.35 
 
The Innocent Child  
By the mid-nineteenth century, this shift in the meaning of childhood culminated in a 
highly sentimentalized notion of childhood. This new construction was predicated largely 
on the notion that children were innately innocent. While innocence has since been 
naturalized as an aspect—if not a requisite—of childhood, its relationship to childhood is 
in fact historically located, not essential.36 According to Sánchez-Eppler, the Romantic 
vision of the innocent child marked a departure from prevailing Calvinist conceptions of 
“infant depravity,” which posited children as inherently sinful. In the colonial era, child-
rearing and religious education centered on the Calvinist belief that children were 
																																																						
34 Jacqueline Reinier, From Virtue to Character: American Childhood, 1775-1850, (New 
York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 21. 
35 Rose, The Case of Peter Pan, 8; Heininger, “Children, Childhood, and Change in 
America,” 2. 
36 Bernstein, Racial Innocence, 4. 
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naturally sinful and sexual.37 By the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the 
orthodox notion of innate sin receded from popular consciousness, replaced by a liberal 
notion of innate innocence. Children no longer represented damnable heathens, but rather 
incipient, holy angels. As Sánchez-Eppler notes, this shift marked “the desire of an 
increasingly domestic and child-centered American middle-class to believe that their 
children, at least, were innately good.”38 
 This evolution was gradual, but it was also complete: “By the mid-nineteenth 
century, sentimental culture had woven childhood and innocence together wholly. 
Childhood was then understood not as innocent but as innocence itself; not as a symbol 
of innocence but as its embodiment.”39 Thus, the association between childhood and 
innocence was so strong that innocence not only came to characterize childhood, but also 
to define it, to distinguish it as a distinct period of life. As Sánchez-Eppler explains, age 
did not become a meaningful marker until the turn of the century, and thus “for the 
nineteenth century, childhood is better understood as a status or idea associated with 
innocence and dependency than as a specific developmental or biological period.”40 To be 
a child was to be innocent.  
 And “to be innocent was to be innocent of something, to achieve obliviousness.”41 
James Kincaid describes Victorian childhood as a “wonderfully hollow category,” with 
the purity of the child “figured as negation” of adult sinfulness and, in particular, 
																																																						
37 Sánchez-Eppler, Dependent States, 207. 
38 Ibid., 207. 
39 Bernstein, Racial Innocence, 4. 
40 Sánchez-Eppler, Dependent States, xxi. 
41 Bernstein, Racial Innocence, 6. 
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sexuality.42 Indeed, sentimental constructions of childhood innocence centered largely on 
the child’s purported obliviousness to sexual desire. Whereas Calvinist notions of infant 
depravity posited children as inherently sexual—unrestrained by adult rationality and 
self-discipline—the sentimental child was eminently good and divinely pure, empty of 
sexual impulse.43 Kincaid notes that, in the Victorian period, as children were understood 
increasingly as a group distinct from adults, and increasingly as their own biological 
category, childhood came to be defined sexually—or rather, by the absence of sex.44 In 
this period, the dividing line between childhood and adulthood “seems to have achieved 
general currency under the name of puberty”: menstruation separated girlhood from 
womanhood, while nocturnal emissions and other secondary signs separated (if more 
vaguely) boyhood from manhood.45 If childhood ended with the onset of sexuality, then 
childhood itself was necessarily desexualized—children were naturally oblivious to, or 
innocent of, sex. 
 Importantly, Romantic constructions of childhood innocence were also 
inextricably tied to questions of race: to be innocent was not only to be oblivious to sex, 
but also to be oblivious to racial difference. Indeed, my readings of racialized childhood 
in nineteenth century culture rest on Robin Bernstein’s notion of “racial innocence”: 
. . . sentimental childlike innocence manifested through the performed 
transcendence of social categories of class, gender, and . . . race. Of course, no 
nineteenth-century children existed outside race (or gender or class), nor were any 
children perceived as unraced. Innocence was not a literal state of being unraced 
but was, rather, the performance of not-noticing, a performed claim of slipping 
beyond social categories.46 
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Thus, sentimental writers like Stowe formulated childhood innocence as a “holy 
ignorance”—a performed forgetting of racial difference disguised as a natural 
obliviousness. 
 Moreover, while the concept of “racial innocence” alleged the child’s ability to 
repel racial knowledge, the “performance of not-noticing” was in fact crucial to the 
racialization of innocence. As Bernstein notes, the “not-noticing” of race is central, and 
unique, to constructions of whiteness, which “derives power from its status as an 
unmarked category.”47 Richard Dyer has argued that because whiteness is invisible, white 
people make a claim to power by being normative, or “‘just’ human,” whereas people of 
color “are something else.”48 Whiteness is the invisible norm against which racial 
difference is defined. As George Lipsitz writes, it “never has to speak its name, never has 
to acknowledge its role as an organizing principle in social and cultural relations.”49 
Childhood “racial innocence” not only reflects this crucial quality of whiteness, but also 
helps to construct and maintain it.50 
 Thus, the concept of “racial innocence” worked to racialize the category of 
childhood. While white children could seemingly transcend racial boundaries by the very 
fact of their whiteness, black children, whose race was marked, fundamentally could not. 
Their blackness was the defining quality of their bodies, the characteristic that 
distinguished them and justified their subordination. To perform obliviousness to this fact 
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was impossible. “Racial innocence” was a quality reserved for white children.51 Given 
that, as Sánchez-Eppler argues, innocence defined childhood in the nineteenth century 
and not the other way around, black children’s exclusion from constructions of innocence 
entailed their exclusion from the category and the protections of childhood. 
 
The Suffering Child 
Importantly, this category was also constructed in terms of pain and the ability to feel it. 
Nineteenth century childhood was not just a state of innocence and dependency, but also 
of supreme vulnerability. In the Victorian construction of childhood, the child’s body—
fragile and helpless—was uniquely susceptible to pain, suffering, and, often, death. 
Indeed, sentimental fiction is so replete with dying or dead children—the most famous, 
perhaps, being Stowe’s Little Eva—that the tragedy of childhood suffering has become a 
narrative cliché. As Sánchez-Eppler notes, “Dying is what children do most and do best 
in the literary and cultural imagination of nineteenth-century America.”52 Importantly, the 
image of the child victim in Victorian culture worked to establish vulnerability and 
suffering as naturalized elements of childhood. By the mid-nineteenth century, childhood 
and pain were inextricable in the American imagination.53 
 And, like innocence, this pain was distributed along racial lines. In early America, 
the politics of pain—questions of which bodies could feel and suffer—were deeply tied 
to the politics of race. As David Morris explains, proponents of slavery believed firmly 
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that “blacks and whites lived in a very different relationship to pain.”54 Whereas white 
pain “cried out for relief,” “black pain, in the eyes of the white-run Southern culture, had 
. . . a minimal social existence.”55 Indeed, many antebellum doctors insisted that black 
insentience was medical fact. In his 1851 Diseases and Peculiarities of the Negro Race, 
Samuel Cartwright, a prominent Southern physician, detailed the symptoms of 
“dysaesthesia aethiopica,” or “hebetude of mind and obtuse sensibility of body.” 
According to Cartwright, the alleged disease was inherent to African Americans and 
resulted in “the stupidness of mind and insensibility of the nerves.”56 It left black bodies 
invulnerable to pain. Of course, there was little logic to this belief: white power was 
maintained and enforced through violence and thus relied on an implicit assumption that 
black slaves could feel and be controlled by pain. Nonetheless, by the mid-nineteenth 
century, the subjugation of African Americans had gained legitimacy under “the libel of 
black insensateness”57—the claim by white slaveholders and their apologists that black 
bodies could not suffer.58 
 There was much at stake in this claim. Elaine Scarry writes that, in American 
society, “the story of physical pain becomes as well a story about the expansive nature of 
human sentience, the felt-fact of aliveness. . . .”59 In other words, the ability to feel and 
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suffer from pain signifies subjectivity, personhood, and fitness for citizenship.60 Indeed, 
abolitionists understood the gravity of pain and focused their efforts on opposing the libel 
of black insensateness. As Laurent Berlant argues, abolitionists worked by establishing 
“the trumping power of suffering,” positing “the enslaved Other as someone with 
subjectivity, which indicated not someone who thinks or works, but someone who has 
endured violence intimately.”61 Slave narratives and, in particular, sentimental fiction 
exposed readers to the brutal horrors of slavery and to the intimate pain of the enslaved. 
In doing so, they worked to establish the humanity of the dispossessed. In Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin, Stowe centers children in this effort. She inscribes the horrors of slavery onto the 
bodies of the white Eva St. Clare and, importantly, the black Topsy. By including Topsy 
in the trope of the child victim—by arguing that the slave girl has the ability to feel and 
suffer from pain—Stowe works to establish her humanity and, importantly, her 
childhood. 
 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin; or, Life Among the Lowly 
Early in the novel, Eliza arrives at the bank of the Ohio river, her sleeping son in her 
arms. Across the frozen river lies the promise of freedom and safety, and behind her lies 
the threat of capture and separation from her child. Empowered by the force of “maternal 
love, wrought into a paroxysm of frenzy by the near approach of a fearful danger,” Eliza 
crosses the ice:  
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The frosty ground creaked beneath her feet, and she trembled at the sounds; every 
quaking leaf and fluttering shadow sent the blood backward to her heart and 
quickened her footsteps. She wondered within herself at the strength that seemed 
to come upon her; for she felt the weight of her boy as if it had been a feather, and 
every flutter of fear seemed to increase the supernatural power that bore her  
on . . .62 
 
In this moment, Stowe shifts to address the reader directly: “If it were your Harry, 
mother, or your Willie, that were going to be torn from you by the brutal trader . . . how 
fast could you walk?”63 The scene is one of the novel’s most famous—a gripping display 
of maternal love and a heart-wrenching condemnation of slavery as a threat to the family. 
It does exactly what sentimental literature aimed to do, what Stowe confesses in the 
preface as the purpose of the novel: “to awaken sympathy and feeling” in the reader.64 
Stowe asks her readers—in this case, literally—not just to understand Eliza’s emotions, 
but to feel them as if they were their own, as if Eliza’s Harry were their Harry. 
 The novel is replete with scenes like the one above—heartrending portraits of 
families fractured by slavery, of mothers robbed of their children. But the tool that is 
perhaps most crucial to Stowe’s goal “to awaken sympathy” in the reader is her depiction 
of the children themselves. Like the “white slave” photographs a decade earlier, children 
are at the center of Uncle Tom’s Cabin: Stowe inscribes the horrors of slavery onto the 
bodies and souls of Eva St. Clare and Topsy, helpless children at the mercy of a cruel 
system. In doing so, she condemns slavery by rendering it a threat to the sanctity of 
childhood. 
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 Little Eva, in particular, is a paradigm of sentimental childhood: she is supremely 
innocent, and this innocence is raced white. When Tom first catches sight of her on the 
boat, he notes that “her form was the perfection of childish beauty”—“such as one might 
dream for some mythic and allegorical being.”65 In the extended description of Eva that 
follows, Stowe intertwines details of the child’s white body and dress with descriptions of 
her angelic, playful nature. Eva has a “noble” bust and striking “violet blue eyes, shaded 
by heavy fringes of golden brown,” though “her face was remarkable less for its perfect 
beauty of feature than for a singular and dreamy earnestness of expression.”66 She is 
“always dressed in white,” not a spot or stain on her.67 Her eyes are heavy with “spiritual 
gravity,” but she is neither “a grave child or a sad one”: “on the contrary, an airy and 
innocent playfulness seemed to flicker like the shadow of summer leaves over her 
childish face, and around her buoyant figure.”68 Watching her, Tom “half believed that he 
saw one of the angels stepped out of his New Testament.”69 Eva is, simply put, an angel 
on earth. 
 As such, she is empty of all sin. In Kincaid’s terms, her innocence is “figured as 
negation” of earthly and material evil. Stowe depicts Eva as an ethereal “sunbeam or a 
summer breeze,”70 a celestial child whose body and spirit transcend the physical world. 
She is ethereal, gliding about with a “cloud-like tread” and “undulating and aerial 
grace.”71 She melts from the grasp of adults “like a summer cloud,” moving “like a 
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shadow” with “fairy footsteps.”72 Eva’s body is without corporeal weight or earthly 
burden, transcendent and, in Kincaid’s terms, “wonderfully hollow.”73 And her soul is 
equally empty of sin: St. Clare notes that “evil rolls off Eva’s mind like dew off a 
cabbage-leaf,—not a drop sinks in.”74 Her moral purity and goodness are thus also a kind 
of hollowness, a negation of sin and evil. 
 Little Eva—“the emblematic child-angel of the nineteenth century”75—is innocent 
of many things: sexual impulse and desire, greed and gluttony. But perhaps most 
importantly, she is innocent of prejudice. In Bernstein’s terms, she is “racially innocent,” 
able to slip between and beyond social categories, manifesting “a state of holy ignorance” 
to racial difference and the realities of white supremacy.76 Eva is, above all else, tolerant: 
she is kind to Mammy, Topsy, and, in particular, to Tom, with whom she develops a 
close friendship. Her mother, a woman hardened by age, complains that Eva “always was 
disposed to be with servants,” that she “somehow always seems to put herself on an 
equality with every creature that comes near her.”77 As Bernstein explains, “Little Eva 
loves everyone, of every race and age and gender and class, because she transcends the 
adult world; she is already halfway to heaven.”78 But her ability to “not notice” race, “to 
put herself on an equality with every creature that comes near her,” is, in fact, a mark of 
her whiteness. Eva is able to slip between social categories because her race is unmarked, 
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because her whiteness “never has to speak its name.” 79 This quality secures her 
innocence. 
 Furthermore, as Bernstein argues, this innocence is transferable, a property that 
makes it politically useful. When Eva and Tom play, for instance, her “aura of 
innocence” extends to him. 80 As she sits on his knee, “gayly laughing,” filling his 
buttonholes with flowers and “hanging a wreath round his neck,” he cracks “a sober, 
benevolent smile.”81 Their kinship grants Tom access to Eva’s white, childish 
innocence.82 Eva serves as a moral lesson in tolerance, both to the other characters and to 
the readers. Her own virtue can make other people kinder. When she dies, for instance, 
her aunt Ophelia, once hardened with prejudice, resolves to love slaves, telling a 
distraught Topsy: “I can love you, though I am not like that dear child. I hope I’ve learnt 
something of the love of Christ from her. I can love you; I do. . . . ”83 Little Eva’s innate 
goodness, her white childhood innocence, can be taught and learned, and therefore used 
politically to advance the cause of abolition. 
 Importantly, Eva’s friendship with Tom speaks as much to racist constructions of 
black adulthood as it does to constructions of white childhood: Stowe constructs Eva’s 
racial innocence in tandem with Tom’s adult childishness. He embodies the stereotype of 
the “childlike Negro”: he has “the soft, impressible nature of his kindly race, ever 
yearning toward the simple and childlike.”84 He is simple, docile, and affectionate, and 
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thus he and Eva are compatible in their mutual childishness. When they talk, each one is 
“equally earnest, and about equally ignorant,” and when they play they share in childlike 
wonder.85 According to Bernstein, the stereotype of the “childlike Negro” was common 
in abolitionist culture and was anything but accidental: “it strategically sutured abolition 
to white supremacy.”86 Tom is lovable and harmless, but he is also pitiable. While Eva’s 
innocence grants her the privilege to “put herself on an equality with every creature,” 
Tom’s innocence makes him an adult-child, helpless and inferior. 
 As Anna Mae Duane explains, Eva and Tom have something else in common in 
their mutual childishness: they are both victims of a system beyond their control, and 
they both “suffer at length and die.”87 Indeed, suffering is crucial to their experience of 
childhood: “Slavery breaks Eva’s heart and Tom’s body because neither of them has the 
power to alter slavery’s grasp,” because they are both defenseless and vulnerable by 
nature.88 While the violence of slavery kills Tom directly—he is beaten to death by his 
cruel master, Simon Legree—Eva’s death is somewhat more vague and circuitous. As she 
bears witness to the horrors of slavery—to the tragic stories of Topsy and Prue—she ails 
and dies slowly of heartbreak. “These things sink into my heart,” she tells Tom, “they 
sink into my heart.”89  
Eva’s death is, in many ways, the crux of the novel. As Bernstein notes, it 
occasions “a blizzard of whiteness”90: “The statuettes and pictures in Eva’s room were 
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shrouded in white napkins,” “the bed was draped in white,” and Eva herself lay “robed in 
one of the simple white dresses she had been wont to wear when living.” It also occasions 
a reckoning amongst her loved ones: rocked by grief, Topsy, Ophelia, and St. Clare all 
vow to live more virtuously in Eva’s memory. Ophelia promises to love Topsy, who 
reforms her wicked ways, and St. Clare converts to Christianity, feeling “himself borne, 
on the tide of his faith and feeling, almost to the gates of that heaven,” brought “nearer to 
Eva.”91 
 In part, the drama of Eva’s death speaks to a general preoccupation with death in 
sentimental culture. As Isabelle White notes, “death scenes sold novels in mid-
nineteenth-century America.”92A publisher’s blurb for Sarah Evans’s Resignation, for 
instance, advertised fifty-seven death scenes—“one every ten pages.”93 White argues that, 
rather than being extravagantly decorative, these death scenes served a crucial purpose in 
sentimental literature: they evoked a moment of communal, public mourning in the 
readers. Moreover, Eva’s death derives its particular power from her status as a white 
child. Her death is, in Zelizer’s terms, “an intolerable sacrilege,” the most extreme of all 
tragedies. In the drama of Eva’s death, Stowe insists that her readers grieve for the lost 
child and for the atrocity of slavery that killed her. 
 Importantly, Eva’s death is also crucial to the maintenance of her innocence. 
Little Eva dies before she can sin—before she matures from the “wonderfully hollow 
category” of childhood to damnable adolescence. The “blizzard of whiteness” that 
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blankets her room represents the afterlife of her innocence, preserved in memory and in 
death. Indeed, according to Stowe, Eva’s supreme innocence makes her death inevitable: 
“Has there ever been a child like Eva? Yes, there have been; but their names are always 
on grave-stones, and their sweet smiles, their heavenly eyes, their singular words and 
ways, are among the buried treasures of yearning hearts.”94 Eva is an angel on earth, 
“already halfway to heaven,”95 and thus her premature death fulfills her destiny. 
 If Eva, in her life and death, is the very embodiment of white sentimental 
childhood, then what does this mean for Topsy, her foil? In both appearance and behavior 
Topsy contrasts starkly with Eva, and while Eva’s innocence is raced white, Topsy’s 
impurity is raced black. The young slave girl “was one of the blackest of her race,” with 
“woolly hair . . . stuck out in every direction.” Her face expresses “an odd mixture of 
shrewdness and cunning”96 and her eyes are “wicked” with “sanctimonious gravity.”97 
While Eva is “cloud-like” and ethereal, pale and dressed always in white without spot or 
stain, Topsy is dark, grave, and violent, “dressed in a single filthy, ragged garment, made 
of bagging.”98 Stowe admits that “there was something odd and goblin-like about her 
appearance,” something “heathenish.”99 As Bernstein notes, Stowe exploited existing 
minstrel humor to create Topsy, evident in her propensity for violence and her raucous 
dancing.100 In contrast to Eva, then, Topsy appears a non-child: she is corrupt, violent, 
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and savage. She is not innocent, like Eva, and she can never pretend to slip between 
social categories: her blackness is unmistakably marked.  
 But importantly, while Stowe denies Topsy many of the privileges of childhood 
that she grants Eva, she also works simultaneously to include Topsy in the category of 
childhood. Indeed, central to Stowe’s condemnation of slavery is her insistence that 
Topsy is, in fact, a child. Stowe configures Topsy’s impurity as a result of a brutal 
system: slavery has hardened the child, robbing her of her essential innocence and 
making her “wicked” instead. The two children embody “the two extremes of society”: 
Eva, “the fair, high-bred child,” and Topsy, “her black, keen, subtle, cringing, yet acute 
neighbor.” While Eva represents “the Saxon, born of ages of cultivation,” Topsy 
represents “the Afric, born of ages of oppression, submission, ignorance, toil, and 
vice!”101 They are polar opposites, but, as Bernstein notes, “polarity is a form of 
connection.”102 To Stowe, the contrast between the children speaks to the power of the 
system that has brutalized Topsy, to the “ages of oppression” her race has endured, not to 
any innate difference.  
 Much of Stowe’s argument for Topsy’s inclusion in childhood rests on proving 
that Topsy, like Eva, can suffer from the pain she endures. In this way, Stowe follows in 
the tradition of other abolitionists who worked by establishing the “trumping power of 
suffering,” centering the slave’s ability to feel pain as proof of their humanity. The 
hardened Topsy often insists on her own insentience: when she misbehaves, she invites 
Ophelia to whip her, taunting, “‘Law Missis, you must whip me; my old Missis allers 
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whipped me. I an’t used to workin’ unless I gets whipped.” When Ophelia complies, 
Topsy proclaims that she didn’t feel a thing: “Law, Miss Feely whip!—wouldn’t kill a 
skeeter, her whippins.”103 Nor does Topsy admit to feeling the pain of her emotional 
abuse: when Eva insists that “‘Miss Ophelia would love you, if you were good,’” Topsy 
replies, “‘No; she can’t bar me, ‘cause I’m a nigger!—she’d soon have a toad touch her! 
There can’t nobody love niggers, and niggers can’t do nothin’! I don’t care.’”104 
 But while Topsy often insists that she is impervious to pain, Stowe shows that the 
opposite is true: Topsy, like Eva, suffers deeply from a system beyond her control. 
Indeed, St. Clare first buys Topsy from the owners of a restaurant he passes everyday 
when he grows “tired of hearing her screaming, and them beating and swearing at her.”105 
The memory of these beatings is inscribed on Topsy’s body: “on the back and shoulders 
of the child, great welts and calloused spots, ineffaceable marks of the system under 
which she had grown up thus far.”106 As Bernstein argues, Topsy’s scars serve as proof of 
her ability to feel pain: “pain, as a fundamental aspect of the system of slavery, hardened 
Topsy because she felt it.”107 Her capacity to feel and suffer from the brutality of slavery 
robbed her of her natural childhood innocence. 
 When St. Clare first puts Topsy under Ophelia’s care—a social experiment, of 
sorts, a “fresh-caught specimen” for her to “educate”108—he intends to repair the wounds 
of her abuse, “to bring her up in the way she should go.”109 The stubborn and prejudiced 
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Ophelia protests, “‘It is your system makes such children,’” and St. Clare affirms, “‘I 
know it; but they are made,—they exist,—and what is to be done with them?” Indeed, 
Stowe maintains that there is much to be done with them: the injustice of slavery can be 
redressed—Topsy’s childhood can be restored—if not by the reluctant Ophelia then 
through contact with the angelic Eva. Little Eva, whose innocence is transferable, has the 
power to heal Topsy with her righteous love.110 Before Eva dies, she confronts Topsy 
about her misbehavior, asking, “‘What does make you so bad, Topsy?’” When Topsy 
replies that she is unloved—“There can’t nobody love niggers”—Eva, “with a sudden 
burst of feeling,” touches Topsy’s shoulder, declaring, “I love you, and I want you to be 
good.” The touch of Eva’s “thin, white hand” and the kindness of her words soften 
Topsy: “The round, keen eyes of the black child were overcast with tears … Yes, in that 
moment, a ray of real belief, a ray of heavenly love, had penetrated the darkness of her 
heathen soul!” As Topsy weeps—admitting to the weight of her pain—Eva bends over 
her, “like the picture of some bright angel stooping to reclaim a sinner.”111 This moment 
represents more than the salvation of Topsy’s soul: it marks the restoration of her 
innocence and the reclamation of her childhood. 
This pivotal scene highlights a tension underlying Stowe’s notions of childhood: 
Topsy is at once a non-child and a potential child, a heathen and a victim. She is a racist 
caricature for comic relief and she is the crux of Stowe’s indictment of slavery. This 
tension is not incidental: throughout the novel Stowe formulates a deeply complicated, 
and often contradictory, relationship between race and childhood. To a great extent, 
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Stowe’s construction of sentimental childhood is raced white. Little Eva, the iconic child-
angel, is the embodiment of innocence and victimhood—and her whiteness is not simply 
decorative: it is crucial to her divine goodness, to her innocence and her pain. Topsy, on 
the other hand, does not meet the conditions of childhood that Eva establishes: she has 
been hardened by slavery, made “wicked” rather than good, corrupt rather than innocent. 
That she can only be restored to childhood through contact with a white child is telling: 
Topsy’s blackness is as crucial to her corruption as Eva’s whiteness is to her innocence. 
As Bernstein notes, the legacy of this construction has been profound: Uncle Tom’s  
Cabin helped to install “a black-white logic in American visions of childhood,” whereby 
whiteness conferred inclusion in the category and blackness did not.112 
 That being said, Stowe is also making a more complex and sophisticated 
argument: that Topsy is “wicked” because the system has made her that way, that she was 
once a child but has been turned something else by the inhumanity of slavery. This is the 
crux of her case for abolition: slavery, whose greatest evil was robbing Eva of her life 
and Topsy of her innocence, is a threat to the sanctity of childhood. As the following 
chapter will show, by the end of the nineteenth century American popular culture had 
erased this nuance completely. Stowe’s “black-white logic” was consolidated into an 
ideology of American childhood that broadly excluded black children from its 
protections.
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Chapter 2: The Pickaninny in American Popular Culture 
 In 1901, Chicago-based publishing house Jamieson-Higgins released the first 
edition of Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin by Grace Duffie Boylan. The book offered a 
shortened, simplified, and censored version of Stowe’s classic text—of Eliza’s harrowing 
escape and Eva’s tragic death—aimed at children. Boylan’s Young Folks’ is far from the 
only adaptation of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Indeed, since its publication in 1852 the novel has 
undergone countless permutations, translated to stage and screen, visualized in painting 
and sculpture, commemorated with memorabilia like dolls and handkerchiefs.113 Stowe’s 
death in 1896—the same year that Plessy v. Ferguson upheld legal segregation in the 
United States—occasioned a particularly strong re-interest in the Uncle Tom story. 
Publishers began reissuing the novel, often, like the 1901 edition, adapted for younger 
audiences.114 Importantly, these children’s editions provide compelling evidence for 
changes in racialized constructions of childhood between the publication of the original 
text and the turn of the twentieth century. 
 These changes will be the focus of this chapter. I will examine how, in the context 
of mounting racial discrimination and violence at the end of the nineteenth century, 
American popular culture consolidated a racist construction of childhood that excluded 
black children. I will begin by looking broadly at the rise of mass culture in the late 
nineteenth century, and then, more specifically, at the emergence and proliferation of the 
“pickaninny” caricature. I argue, following Robin Bernstein, that the caricature of the 
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pickaninny excluded black children from the category and protections of childhood by 
depicting them as insentient—unable to feel or suffer from pain. As Bernstein writes, 
“pain, and the ability to feel it . . . is what divided white childhood from black childhood 
in U.S. popular culture.”115 Finally, I will look closely at Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin to understand how these changes culminated in a revision of Stowe’s text that 
fundamentally altered her argument about race and the nature of innocence. 
  
Mass Culture and Racial Representation 
 The decades following the Civil War were a turbulent period American society: as 
blacks made the transition from bondage to freedom, whites grappled with the end of 
slavery.116 Notably, the years following Reconstruction (1865-77) saw a marked 
deterioration of race relations. 117 As W. Fitzhugh Brundage explains, “The Civil War had 
left unresolved the status of African Americans as citizens,” and so at the end of the 
nineteenth century “white Americans engaged in strenuous debate over their ‘Negro 
problem.’”118 In other words, they struggled to maintain and impose white supremacy in a 
post-slavery society. In the 1880s and ‘90s—sometimes referred to as “the nadir” of 
American race relations—legalized segregation and racial violence became the 
structuring forces of daily life throughout the United States, but particularly in the Jim 
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Crow South, where blacks were systematically denied the right to vote and where riots 
and lynchings were epidemic.119  
 This volatile historical moment coincided with the rise of mass culture in the 
United States. In the late nineteenth century, technological innovations gave rise to an 
“era of ‘public amusements’”: new forms of mass entertainment like phonograph parlors 
and silent films transformed and commercialized American leisure.120 The invention of 
steam-powered rotary printing presses in 1843 made the mass production of printed 
material easier and cheaper, and by the turn of the century dime novels and magazines 
proliferated.121 As Barry Shank explains, chromolithography, which made possible the 
mass production of colored prints, helped give rise to the wildly successfully greeting and 
postcard industries.122 Increasingly, Americans were distributing and consuming novelties 
and ephemera, and this burgeoning consumer culture was accompanied by a revolution in 
advertising: new competition necessitated new catchy slogans and colorful packaging.123 
 Importantly, these developments in mass culture were deeply involved in 
contemporary political discourses: American popular culture bore witness to, and actively 
participated in, ongoing debates about the “Negro problem.”124 Visual culture in 
particular became a crucial site of racial discourse. As Brundage explains, because 
representations of African Americans “were so conspicuous in the emerging mass culture 
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of the era, blacks were acutely sensitive to the power of popular culture to shape their 
public identity and, indeed, their status as citizens.”125 Technologies of mass culture 
helped to produce and disseminate racist stereotypes of African Americans on an 
unprecedented scale. 
This is particularly evident in advertising: companies capitalized on minstrel 
stereotypes to market mass-produced products. In 1893, for example, the R.T. David Mill 
Company trademarked Aunt Jemima—the quintessential “mammy” caricature—to 
promote their pancake mix, and that same year, Rastus—a caricature of a kindly black 
cook—began appearing on Cream of Wheat cereal boxes. These caricatures evoked a 
romantic nostalgia for the Old South and gave the products a claim to authenticity: 
because of their slave heritage, blacks were believed to have a natural proclivity for 
household labor. By showcasing images of smiling, complaisant blacks, these 
advertisements also worked to assuage white fears of black rebellion and to reassure 
white customers of their racial supremacy.126 
 
The Pickaninny in Popular Culture 
Notably, popular visual culture relied heavily on imagery of black children: the 
pickaninny abounded in minstrel shows, postcards, and advertisements. Although 
pickaninnies are not monolithic in their representation, they typically share a set of 
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characteristics that make them easily recognizable: they have dark, sometimes pitch-
black skin, grotesque, grinning mouths, rolling eyes, and kinky, unkempt hair.127 
 
 
They are often unwashed and scantily clad, if dressed at all. They tend to be highly 
physicalized and sexualized—sometimes their genitals and buttocks are exposed—and 
they are often pictured outdoors alongside animals, gorging on watermelon, dancing, 
climbing, and wrestling.128 
 Like the white slave photographs a half-century earlier, images of pickaninnies at 
the turn of the century made childhood a crucial site of political discourse. They 
implicated children in dialogues about race, citizenship, and the status of African 
Americans in a post-slavery society. By portraying black children as carefree, 
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“mischievous and ignorant to the point of being comic,”129 the pickaninny caricature 
suggested that blacks would do well in slavery.130 
 
 
 The most notable example, perhaps, are the infamous Gold Dust Twins, the 
trademark pickaninnies for Fairbank’s Gold Dust Washing Powder from 1892 until the 
mid-1950s.131 The twins are typically performing work—scrubbing floors or cleaning 
dishes—and yet they are carefree, invariably smiling or dancing. A 1902 advertisement 
from Home and Flowers magazine shows the two twins, each naked aside from a cloth 
around his waist, jovially cleaning a chair. Text at the top of the ad declares, “Let the 
GOLD DUST twins do your work,” and at the bottom: “Slave if you will, but if you 
prefer to make housework easy, use GOLD DUST.”  
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The implication is clear: The Gold Dust Twins are naturally disposed to do the work of 
slaves—they smile under the burden of their labor.  
 Importantly, the caricature of the pickaninny also speaks to changing 
constructions of racialized childhood over the second half of the nineteenth century. As 
the previous chapter showed, sentimental constructions of childhood were unmistakably 
white. To be a child was to be innocent, and to be innocent was to be innocent of racial 
knowledge, to slip in and out of social categories. This ability was reserved for white 
children. Innocence was also defined by vulnerability, by the ability to feel and suffer 
from pain. Sentience conferred personhood, citizenship, and, importantly, inclusion in the 
category of childhood. And while sentience was distributed along racial lines throughout 
the nineteenth century—proponents of slavery justified their violence by libeling slaves 
Figure 6. Early Gold Dust Washing 
Powder box (circa 1900). Jim Crow 
Museum of Racist Memorabilia, Ferris 
State University. 
Figure 5. Advertisement for Gold Dust Washing 
Powder from Home and  
Flowers (October 1902). Google Books. 
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insentient—abolitionist writers like Stowe centered children in their efforts to oppose 
slavery by showing that black bodies could, in fact, suffer. In doing so, they argued for 
the essential childhood of black children. 
 By the turn of the twentieth century this was no longer the case: popular culture 
had consolidated Stowe’s “black-white” logic—the dichotomy that set the white Eva in 
opposition to the black Topsy—into an ideology of childhood that broadly excluded 
black children. Indeed, the pickaninny did not meet the qualifications for childhood 
established in the nineteenth century. As Bernstein explains, pickaninnies were in fact 
“nonchildren,” “juvenile yet excluded from the exalted states of ‘child.’”132 These 
nonchildren were unmistakably and inevitably black, devoid of innocence, and, most 
importantly, insentient.133 While images of pickaninnies vary in appearance, this is their 
uniting and defining trait: their bodies do not suffer from pain. The Gold Dust Twins 
smile as they polish the chair because their work and their play are indistinguishable; they 
do not feel the burden of their labor. 
 Ironically, popular culture fixated on representations of pickaninnies in danger: in 
advertisements and story books they are attacked by dogs, run over by boulders, and set 
on fire.134 The most common and perhaps the most disturbing motif featured black 
children as “alligator bait,” a staple of Southern tourist memorabilia. 
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Postcards and statuettes touted pickaninnies in imminent danger of being eaten alive.135 
Usually the pickaninnies are unsuspecting and ignorant, but when they are afraid their 
fear is theatrical and comic. As Bernstein notes, “When threatened, pickaninny characters 
might ignore danger or quake in exaggerated fear; when attacked, they might laugh or 
yelp, but in either case, they never experience or express pain or sustain wounds in any 
remotely realistic way.”136 The image of pickaninnies in danger is comedic because their 
pain is not real—because they are not included in the protections of childhood. 
 Notably, Stowe’s Topsy is often identified as the prototypical pickaninny. Kevern 
Verney notes that the disreputable slave girl “set a precedent for the enduring image of 
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the ‘pickaninny.’137 Patricia Turner, likewise, declares Topsy “the first truly famous 
pickaninny.”138 Indeed, Topsy did serve as a model for images of the pickaninny at the 
turn of the century: her ragged clothes, “goblin-like” appearance, and propensity for 
violence and misbehavior became the standard for the caricature. But, importantly, later 
formulations of the pickaninny drew as much from Topsy as they omitted. As Turner 
later notes, these images “took a character originally intended to generate disgust for 
slavery and reinvented her as one whose careless actions and carefree attitude suggested 
that black children could thrive within the confines of the ‘peculiar institution.’”139 
Stowe’s Topsy is wicked precisely because she has suffered; she is corrupt because 
slavery has robbed her of her essential childhood. By the turn of the century, popular 
images of the pickaninny had erased this nuance entirely: black children are wicked and 
corrupt by nature, are insensitive to pain, are, in fact, not children at all. 
 
Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin 
The 1901 edition of Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin provides particularly rich evidence 
for this change. As a children’s edition, the adaptation not only adds paratextual 
material—new cover art and original illustrations by Ike Morgan—but also necessarily 
alters the text itself. It retells the familiar story with a younger audience in mind, and, 
importantly, with a different set of cultural and historical assumptions guiding the author. 
Indeed, Boylan’s adaptation reflects the imperatives of Jim Crow segregation and racism 
at the turn of the century. As Barbara Hochman notes, the 1901 edition virtually 
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eliminates “Stowe’s moral, social, and religious concerns” and turns “Stowe’s racialism 
into unadulterated racism.”140 This is particularly evident in Boylan’s treatment of Topsy: 
while Stowe’s Topsy is a tragic product of a vicious system, Boylan’s Topsy is, by 
nature, an insentient pickaninny. And whereas Stowe argues for Topsy’s essential 
childhood, Boylan configures Topsy as an absurd and comedic nonchild. 
   Notably, descriptions of Little Eva are mostly consistent with the original text: 
she is “slight and fair” with “large and blue eyes,” and she is dressed always in white. 
The young girl appears “an angel of kindness and beauty” to “the sad hearts around her.” 
She remains a paradigm of white sentimental innocence, and this innocence, still, is 
figured as a negation of earthly evil. She is light and ethereal, unburdened by material 
weight, flitting about “like a fairy,” perching here and there “like a bright-winged 
bird.”141 Boylan’s Eva is empty of sin and prejudice; she is purely good and purely 
innocent.  
 That being said, she plays a much less crucial role in the adaptation. Boylan 
flattens Eva’s moral and religious drive. Stowe inscribes the horrors of slavery onto Eva’s 
body: she suffers so much because she feels so intensely, because these things “sink” into 
her heart. In Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Eva’s death is the emotional culmination of Stowe’s 
condemnation of slavery: it asks the readers to mourn collectively not just for Eva but for 
the tragedy of slavery at large. Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin erases this aspect of 
Eva’s character. She is innocent, yes, but also carefree and mostly unconcerned with the 
suffering of those around her. Eva’s first encounter with Tom, for instance, is markedly 
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different from the scene in the original text. In Stowe’s account, Eva determines to buy 
Tom in order to save him, declaring, “if [my papa] buys you, you will have good 
times.”142 In Young Folks’, Eva’s reasoning is much more superficial. She proclaims: 
“My papa shall buy you . . . And then you will be my Uncle Tom.”143 Boylan also 
minimizes Eva’s suffering. Her illness is vague and appears completely divorced from 
the problem of slavery. And her death is similarly inconclusive: the characters mourn the 
loss, but it does not occasion the same spiritual and moral reckoning that Stowe 
envisioned. Boylan preserves Eva’s supreme innocence, but she never configures this 
innocence as an affront to slavery. Instead, it appears entirely uncomplicated and 
apolitical. 
 Interestingly, in Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin Topsy assumes Eva’s role as 
the main child character. Her importance is evident from the outset: the cover features an 
image of of the slave girl, dancing alone in a tattered dress, her gangly arms and legs 
extended. Topsy’s appearance is mostly consistent with the original text. The young girl 
is grotesque and “goblin-like,” “one of the blackest, funniest specimens of her race.” She 
is “dressed in a coffee sack,” her hair “braided with little tails which stuck out like spikes 
around her head.” When Miss Ophelia first sees Topsy she looks with “terror” upon that 
“wrinkled, old, odd little face,” “solemn” apart from her “twinkling, mischief-filled 
eyes.”144 
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In the picture above Topsy appears sad, her eyes lowered and her arms hanging limply at 
her side. Rather than serve as evidence of her suffering and sentience, here Topsy’s 
solemnity is a reminder that, unlike the ethereal Eva, who flits about without the burden 
of earthly weight, Topsy is grave and sinful. Importantly, Topsy’s appearance would be 
familiar to a turn of the century audience: she is identical to the pickaninny caricatures 
that proliferated in popular culture. 
Figure 8. “Topsy,” Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 
	 49 
 And like these caricatures, Topsy is mischievous, wild, and shameless. In 
Boylan’s adaptation, Topsy’s antics are descriptive and extensive. For instance, when 
Ophelia tries to question Topsy about her origins, the disinterested slave girl replies, “‘I 
dunno, missis,’” and then, abruptly, falls to the floor and begins “walking on her hands, 
with her black feet in the air.” 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. “Walking on her hands, with her black feet in the air,” Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin. 
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In a shrill voice she sings, “‘O I’se a mis’able sinneh.” Her untamed body keeps time to 
the music, “knocking her knees together in a wild, fantastic sort of time, and spinning 
around, clapping her hands, and then suddenly turning somersaults around the room.”145 
When she finishes her prolonged, unexpected dance, “poor” Miss Ophelia is stunned, 
shuddering “when she thought that she was the owner of this monkey child and was 
expected to make a Christian out of her.”146 Whereas in the original text Ophelia is one of 
the more intolerant, unsympathetic characters, here the reader is invited to empathize 
with the governess, to laugh at Topsy’s outrageous behavior and at the very idea of 
making “a Christian out of her.” 
 Topsy’s minstrel performance is not unique to the 1901 adaptation: Stowe also 
highlights the child’s proclivity for wild, raucous dance. But, importantly, Boylan figures 
physical performance as a natural function of Topsy’s race rather than a learned behavior. 
In Uncle Tom’s Cabin, Topsy dances when St. Clare instructs her to, whistling at her, “as 
a man would to call the attention of a dog,” and demanding, “‘give us a song, now, and 
show us some of your dancing.’”147 But in Young Folks’ she dances by her own volition, 
acting on an apparently natural instinct. Topsy performs physically—she leaps and 
somersaults and twirls—and the readers are encouraged to watch these performances 
from a distance, to gape in awe, like the “horrified” Ophelia, as she walks “on her hands, 
with her black feet in the air.” Boylan’s Topsy has no emotional or intellectual 
subjectivity—she is purely physical, untamed, and “wicked.” 
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 Importantly, Boylan offers no explanation for how Topsy came to be so wicked. 
As the previous chapter showed, this question is central to Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and 
Stowe’s answer is clear: Topsy is wicked because the brutality of slavery made her that 
way. Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin erases this nuance entirely. Topsy’s misbehavior 
is assumed to be a natural, inevitable function of her race. When St. Clare first introduces 
Topsy he refers briefly to her “cruel owners,” but apart from this moment Boylan omits 
her history of abuse completely. Topsy is, simply, a pickaninny—a “monkey child” who 
dances and steals because she is naturally inclined to misbehave. 
 Stowe’s argument for Topsy’s essential childhood rests on proving that the child 
is sentient—that she is hardened precisely because she can feel and suffer from pain. 
Figure 10. Topsy cutting Ophelia’s clothes “all to pieces to make dolls’ jackets,” Young Folks’ 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 
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Boylan makes no such effort: her Topsy is naturally immune to pain, an insentient 
pickaninny. In both versions Topsy insists on her own insentience: she invites Ophelia to 
whip her when she misbehaves, claiming that she is impervious to the pain. But whereas 
Stowe shows that the opposite is in fact true—Topsy’s scars and screams serve as proof 
of her suffering—Boylan maintains the libel of Topsy’s insentience. When Topsy is 
caught wearing her mistress’s clothes, she begs Miss Ophelia to whip her: “‘Yo all ‘s got 
ter whip me. My ole missis used ter whip me, an’ I ain’ used ter workin’ without bein’ 
trounced.’” When Ophelia protests, Topsy insists, “‘I’se got ter be whipped, sure ‘nuff. 
I’se gwine ter fetch yo in dat hick-ry now, an’ yo better tan my black hide good.’”148 
Ophelia complies, “gingerly” holding the stick and laying “a light stroke on the child’s 
back,” “scarcely” touching her at all.149 Topsy, in turn, howls in mock pain: “‘Oh, oh, oh, 
Miss Feely, don’t! Yose killin’ me! Oh, Miss Feely!”150 When she leaves the room she 
recovers immediately. “Perched, like a blackbird, on the balcony,” she tells “a dozen 
admiring pickaninnies” of her experience: “‘Yo all jes’ orter feel de whippin’ I got off 
Miss Feely . . . One little tap dat wouldn’t kill a skeeter.’” Boasting of her own 
insentience Topsy declares, “‘Don’ yo all wish dat yo was wicked like me?’”151 
 Notably, this scene takes place near the end of the book, long after Eva has died. 
This signifies another important revision of the original text: whereas in Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin Topsy virtually disappears after Eva’s death, in Young Folks’ her story continues 
until the very end. In the original novel Eva’s death represents Topsy’s salvation: the 
																																																						
148 Boylan, Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 128. 
149 Ibid., 128-129. 
150 Boylan, Young Folks’ Uncle Tom’s Cabin, 129. 
151 Ibid., 129. 
	 53 
memory of Eva inspires her to be good and allows her to reclaim her natural innocence. 
Once a nonchild, she is returned to childhood. In her adaptation Boylan offers no such 
possibility of salvation. Because Topsy’s wickedness is natural, it is also permanent: she 
is inevitably, inalterably, an insentient pickaninny, a nonchild.  
Indeed, the final scene of the book confirms her inability to change. Topsy, now 
slightly older, dances one last time: “All the mischief that had been Topsy’s strongest 
characteristic sprang to her face, and in a moment she was up and taking part in the merry 
dance with all her old time spirit.”152 The image of the grown Topsy dancing with the 
“mischief” of “her old time spirit” reveals the mutuality of the caricature of the 
pickaninny and the caricature of the childlike Negro. The young Topsy is juvenile but 
never quite a child, the old Topsy grown but never quite an adult. Boylan’s Topsy passes 
from childhood to adulthood without ever securing inclusion in either category—she is 
forever mischievous, forever absurd, forever nonhuman. 
 Importantly, the two versions of Uncle Tom’s Cabin represent two very different 
political projects: whereas Stowe’s novel condemns slavery as a moral atrocity, Boylan’s 
adaptation enacts the imperatives of Jim Crow segregation and racism. Boylan erases 
Stowe’s moral concerns largely by revising her child characters—by transfiguring Topsy, 
a character meant to inspire disgust in the “peculiar institution,” into a nonchild whose 
carelessness and mischievousness suggest that she would do well within the confines of 
slavery. These revisions highlight changes in the way childhood was conceptualized, and 
racialized, in the second half of the nineteenth century. By the turn of the century, 
American popular culture had consolidated Stowe’s “black-white logic” into a white 
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supremacist construction of childhood that excluded black children from its protections. 
The following chapter will examine how black activists and writers in the mid-twentieth 
century grappled with and resisted the legacy of this construction. 
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Chapter 3: The Bluest Eye and the Politics of Black Childhood  
 Perhaps the most disturbing, and the most resonant, image of the civil rights 
movement is the photograph of Emmett Till’s mangled corpse. The details of Till’s 
murder are well documented: the 14-year-old boy, originally from Chicago, was visiting 
family in Mississippi in August 1955. One afternoon, Till ventured into a local store, 
bought some gum, and allegedly whistled at a white woman behind the counter. Several 
days later, the woman’s husband, Roy Bryant, and his half-brother, J. W. Milam, stole 
Till from his great-uncle’s home, forced him into their truck and into a barn where they 
tortured and killed him. They dumped his body, tied to a cotton gin fan, into the 
Tallahatchie River.153 Bryant and Milam went to trial, but the all-white, all-male jury in 
Sumner, Mississippi quickly declared them not guilty despite overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary. 
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 Till’s mother, Mamie Till Bradley, insisted that photographers attend the open-
casket funeral so the whole world could mourn her son’s body, brutalized and mangled 
and broken. Photographs of Till’s corpse subsequently appeared in Jet, a black magazine, 
and then dozens of other publications, transforming Bradley’s private grief into a public 
spectacle.154 Newspapers and magazines typically published the photograph of Till’s 
mutilated corpse alongside an earlier portrait of him, smiling, dressed in a shirt and tie.  
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As Katharine Capshaw notes, “Black children during the civil rights movement were thus 
aware of two images of Till: one that evoked respectability, youth, and serenity, and 
another that demonstrated a frightening possibility for black childhood within a racist 
society.”155 The image of Till’s desecrated body was made all the more devastating next 
to this “visual construction of his integrity.”156 These photographs—the one of Till 
smiling alongside the one of him dead—became visual shorthand for the depths of 
southern racism. They reminded the American public that, as civil rights activist Myrlie 
Evers observed, “even a child was not safe from racism, bigotry, and death.”157 
 Till’s murder was certainly not the first of its kind—it followed in a long tradition 
of racially motivated lynchings in the Jim Crow South—but it does hold a particularly 
important place in the collective memory of the civil rights movement. Indeed, the 
horrifying photographs of Till’s corpse helped to motivate a new generation of black 
activists. Joyce Ladner, a former member of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating 
Committee (SNCC) and now a prominent sociologist, recalls how the image terrified and 
inspired her generation: “‘All of us remembered the photograph of Emmett Till’s face, 
lying in the coffin. . . . Every one of my SNCC friends . . . recall[ed] that photograph. [It] 
galvanized a generation as a symbol—that was our symbol—that if they did it to him, 
they could do it to us.’”158 In her 1981 poem, “Afterimages,” black writer and activist 
																																																						
155 Katharine Capshaw, Civil Rights Childhood: Picturing Liberation in African American 
Photobooks (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), ix. 
156 Ibid., x. 
157 Henry Hampton and Steve Fayer, Voices of Freedom: An Oral History of the Civil 
Rights Movement from the 1950s through the 1980s (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 
6. 
158 J. Berger, “Understanding a Photography,” 293, quoted in Capshaw, Civil Rights 
Childhood, x. 
	 58 
Audre Lorde offers a similar memory. She describes how the image of the boy’s corpse 
haunted her, “his broken body” becoming “the afterimage of [her] 21st year.” Lorde 
contrasts the memory of his smiling portrait—“his 15 years puffed out like bruises/on 
plump boy-cheeks”—with the image of his mutilated face: “the length of gash across the 
dead boy’s loins,” “the severed lips, how many burns/ his gouged out eyes/sewed shut 
upon the screaming cover.” She recalls: 
 . . . wherever I looked that summer 
 I learned to be at home with children’s blood 
 with savored violence 
 with pictures of black broken flesh. 159 
To the generation that came of age during the civil rights movement, Till became a child 
martyr, a symbol of the toll of racism and the urgency of change.160  
  Till’s power as a symbol rested in his status as a child. As Rebecca de Schweinitz 
notes, this status was highly contested: the trial that followed his murder was as much a 
trial of Till’s innocence as his killers’, a debate over “what kind of boy” Till was.161 The 
defense made their case largely by depicting Till as indecent and immoral, a “‘husky 
Negro lad’” who had molested an innocent white woman. By appealing to negative 
stereotypes of black men, and by pitting these stereotypes against the sanctity of white 
womanhood, the defendants’ lawyers and the Southern press argued that Till had invited 
his own death. Importantly, they also suggested that Till was not included in the category 
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of childhood—that his alleged actions were symptomatic of predatory black male 
sexuality rather than boyhood bravado. In contrast, sympathetic journalists and the legal 
prosecution depicted Till in terms that reflected his smiling portrait: he was respectable 
and happy-go-lucky, and, most of all, he was innocent.162 At stake in this debate was 
Till’s childhood. 
  The power of the photographs of Till and the debates over his innocence speak 
more broadly to the importance of children as symbols in the civil rights movement. Like 
the pictures of Till, photographs circulated of the Little Rock Nine assaulted by angry 
crowds as they entered Central High School in 1957; of young people being attacked by 
police dogs and fire hoses at the 1963 Birmingham Children’s Crusade; and of the four 
little girls killed in the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church bombing that same year.163 While 
American popular culture at the turn of the twentieth century had libeled black children 
insentient, by midcentury black activists had made the black child’s ability to feel and 
suffer from pain the crux of their campaign for civil rights. The contest over “what kind 
of boy” Emmett Till was reveals as much: Till’s defenders insisted on his essential 
innocence and condemned the racist violence against him as a violation of his childhood. 
In centering the image of the black child victim, civil rights activists worked to include 
black children in the protections of sacralized childhood.  
 Importantly, African American literature during and after the civil rights 
movement also used childhood as a site of resistance. As Geta Leseur argues, in the 
second half of the twentieth century, African American novelists relied heavily on the 
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form of the bildungsroman to construct protests that were “almost always about race, 
slave history, and the White establishment.”164 In other words, black writers used 
narratives of childhood as a site of political discourse, often configuring an initiation into 
the reality of racism as a sort of coming-of-age. We can understand novels like Ralph 
Ellison’s Invisible Man (1952), James Baldwin’s Go Tell It on the Mountain (1953), 
Gwendolyn Brooks’ Maud Martha (1953), Maya Angelou’s I Know Why the Caged Bird 
Sings (1969), and Alice Walker’s The Color Purple (1982) in this context. These texts 
actively grappled with and resisted white supremacist constructions of childhood that turn 
of the century popular culture had institutionalized. 
 In this chapter I will examine another such novel: Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye 
(1970). It is important to note that my approach to The Bluest Eye differs from my 
approach to earlier texts. In my studies of Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Young Folks’ Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin, I was primarily concerned with understanding how the white authors raced 
childhood and determining if they included black children in this category. This is not the 
case in my analysis of The Bluest Eye: here, I am interested in the way Morrison grapples 
with the legacy of these racist constructions of childhood. The question of whether her 
children count as children is null—I assume from the outset that they do. The more 
relevant question, in this case, is how Morrison’s child characters disrupt the hegemonic, 
white constructions of childhood that texts like Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Young Folks’ 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin helped to institutionalize. 
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 In many ways, Morrison follows in the tradition of civil rights activists who 
position black children as victims of a racist system. She does so largely through the 
character of Pecola, whose life and mind fall apart as a result of abuse, neglect, and racial 
self-loathing. Morrison inscribes the horrors of American white supremacy onto the 
psyches of her black girls, and in doing so she appeals to sentimentalized notions of 
sacred childhood. But I am more interested in another, less obvious element of 
Morrison’s treatment of childhood: at the same time that she centers the pain and 
vulnerability of her child characters, she takes apart the idea of childhood all together. 
That is, she reveals the extent to which dominant constructions of childhood—our 
notions of what a child looks like and acts like—are raced white and exclude black 
children. In re-racializing whiteness, Morrison disrupts and disempowers white 
supremacist constructions of childhood. 
 
The Bluest Eye 
At the center of The Bluest Eye are three black girls: our partial narrator, Claudia 
MacTeer, her older sister Frieda, and Pecola Breedlove, their classmate and, for some 
time, houseguest. We learn of Pecola’s tragic life through the eyes of Claudia: she tells us 
how Pecola is abused and neglected, how she is raped and impregnated by her father, 
how she longs for blue eyes, and how, finally, she slips into madness. The fact that the 
narration is mostly first person, assuming Claudia’s deeply empathetic and shrewd, if 
sometimes naïve, perspective, signifies from the outset that Morrison’s project is entirely 
different from Harriet Beecher Stowe’s a century earlier. Morrison grants her child 
characters subjectivity: we have access to their complicated thoughts, emotions, and 
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motivations, and we understand them as agents. Whereas Stowe configured childhood as 
a negation, a sort of “emptiness,” Morrison writes child characters who are complex and 
full. 
 Like civil rights-era photography, The Bluest Eye positions children as victims of 
American racism. But whereas the images of Till evoked the physical toll of white 
supremacy—racist hatred and violence inscribed onto his body—Morrison is concerned 
with the psychological toll: her child characters, to greater or lesser extents, internalize 
the hatred directed at them. In her foreword, Morrison admits that she was drawn to the 
particular “woundability” of girls.165 She explains, “The death of self-esteem can occur 
quickly, easily in children, before their ego has ‘legs,’ so to speak.”166 Thus she chose to 
focus “on how something as grotesque as the demonization of an entire race could take 
root inside the most delicate member of society: a child; the most vulnerable member: a 
female.”167 Claudia, Frieda, and Pecola must navigate the pain of a world in which their 
blackness signifies ugliness and their childhood is unsacred. 
 In this world, adults treat them with indifference at best and, at worst, disdain. 
When Pecola visits a local store, for instance, she notes without surprise or affect that the 
white shopkeeper refuses to look at her, that “somewhere between retina and object, 
between vision and view, his eyes draw back, hesitate, hover.” She observes him, 
studying “the vacuum where curiosity ought to lodge,” and sees instead a “total absence 
of human recognition,” a “glazed separateness.”168 This is not the charged hatred she is 
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accustomed to, the “interest, disgust, even anger in grown male eyes” she has seen 
before, but nonetheless this indifference “has an edge”: “somewhere in the bottom lid is 
the distaste.” And Pecola, initiated into the realities of racism, knows that her blackness is 
the reason: “The distaste must be for her, her blackness. All things in her are flux and 
anticipation. But her blackness is static and dread. And it is the blackness that accounts 
for, that creates, the vacuum edged with distaste in white eyes.”169 Pecola leaves the store 
devastated. At first she is angry, but at least “there is a sense of being in anger.” Before 
long, her anger subsides to “shame,” to a dull and complacent acceptance of her 
inferiority.170 
 Claudia and Frieda, who have the benefit of a stable and loving home, are mostly 
able to resist the force of this racism, to safeguard their self-worth in the face of 
enormous pressure to concede it. But Pecola is not so lucky. She spends “long hours . . . 
looking in the mirror, trying to discover the secret of the ugliness, the ugliness that made 
her ignored or despised at school, by teachers and classmates alike.”171 Over time, her 
racial self-loathing culminates in an intense desire to see the world through blue eyes: 
“Each night, without fail, she prayed for blue eyes. Fervently, for a year she had 
prayed.”172 She accepts as self-evident the superiority of blue eyes and the whiteness they 
epitomize. Importantly, Pecola yearns most of all for the treatment that blue eyes would 
entail. She believes that “if those eyes of hers were different, that is to say, beautiful,” her 
teachers and classmates and parents would treat her differently, that is to say, well. She 
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imagines, “Maybe they’d say, ‘Why, look at pretty-eyed Pecola. We mustn’t do bad 
things in front of those pretty eyes.’”173 To Pecola, blue eyes promise access to the 
privileges and protections of sacralized white childhood innocence. 
 Ultimately, Pecola bends and breaks under the force of her self-hatred. After her 
baby dies, the flowers that Claudia and Frieda planted in its honor dying as well, she slips 
into madness, believing that her wish for blue eyes has finally been granted. Claudia 
solemnly recalls her friend’s delirium:  
The damage done was total. She spent her days, her tendril, sap-green days, 
walking up and down, up and down, her head jerking to the beat of a drummer so 
distant only she could hear. Elbows bent, hands on shoulders, she flailed her arms 
like a bird in an eternal, grotesquely futile effort to fly. Beating the air, a winged 
but grounded bird, intent on the blue void it could not reach—could not even 
see—but which filled the valleys of the mind.174 
 
Like the photographs of Emmett Till, this final image of Pecola shows a black child 
destroyed by the violence of racism.  
 But if Morrison emphasizes Pecola’s victimhood, her other child characters, and 
in particular Claudia, serve a somewhat different function. While Claudia is subjected to 
the same hatred as Pecola, she resists internalizing assumptions of her inferiority. Unlike 
Pecola, she does not take as self-evident the supremacy of blue eyes or the ideal of white 
childhood they signify. Thus, through the character of Claudia, Morrison makes an 
argument about childhood that is more complicated, and more radical, than victimhood: 
she interrogates and dismantles hegemonic white supremacist constructions of childhood. 
 In contrast to Pecola, who has been conditioned to passivity through abuse and 
neglect, Claudia is strong-willed and critical. Unlike most girls her age, for instance, she 
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detests Shirley Temple, a Little Eva-like icon of white girlhood. As Sam Vásquez notes, 
Temple’s image proliferated in the 1940s, reaching a broad audience not only through her 
popular films but also through commodities like the Shirley Temple cup the MacTeers 
have in their kitchen. Temple’s ringleted blond hair and smiling, “dimpled face”175 helped 
to disseminate white standards of beauty and innocence to children.176 Indeed, both Frieda 
and Pecola adore her: gazing “fondly” at her face on the “blue-and-white” cup, the two 
girls have “a loving conversation about how cu-ute Shirley Temple was.”177 To them, 
Temple embodies adorableness—not only in the sense of being “cu-ute” but, importantly, 
in the sense of being worthy of love. To Pecola in particular, Temple represents an 
aspiration of white childhood. 
 Through the resistant perspective of Claudia, Morrison makes explicit the racist 
underpinnings of this ideal. Temple’s “cu-ute”-ness is not self-evident, nor is the 
presumption that she is somehow superior, her childhood somehow more sacred, than the 
black girls who admire her. Morrison shows that Frieda and Pecola’s inclination to adore 
Temple is a behavior conditioned by white supremacist constructions of childhood. 
Indeed, Claudia admits that she has not yet learned this behavior: “Younger than both 
Frieda and Pecola, I had not yet arrived at the turning point in the development of my 
psyche which would allow me to love her. What I felt at that time was unsullied 
hatred.”178 Interestingly, Claudia dislikes Temple “not because she was cute, but because 
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she danced with Bojangles,” a black tap dancer who was often featured alongside the 
child actress. Claudia insists, enviously, that Bojangles “was my friend, my uncle, my 
daddy, and . . . ought to have been soft-shoeing it and chuckling with me. Instead,” she 
protests, “he was enjoying, sharing, giving a lovely dance thing with one of those little 
white girls whose socks never slid down under their heels.”179 To Claudia, Temple 
represents the privileges of white childhood that she cannot access: the white girl, who is 
racially innocent, is able to transcend racial boundaries, to consume and perform 
blackness by dancing with Bojangles. Claudia does not understand why she does not have 
the same privileges—why she does not get to dance with Bojangles. She does not take 
these inequalities as self-evident. 
 And she is equally off-put by baby dolls. Claudia explains that her “unsullied 
hatred” for “all the Shirley Temples of the world” had “begun with Christmas and the gift 
of dolls.”180 Each year she receives “a big, blue-eyed Baby Doll.” Claudia knows that she 
is expected to adore the doll the way other girls adore Shirley Temple. She quickly 
understands that the object is a script dictating a certain performance of girlhood181: she is 
meant to “rock it, fabricate storied situations around it, even sleep with it.” Indeed, 
popular culture has made this script clear: “picture books were full of little girls sleeping 
with their dolls.”182 On the one hand, the dolls script a gendered performance—Claudia is 
supposed to mother it—but it also scripts a racial performance. She is supposed to sleep 
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with her white dolls like the white girls in picture books do—in other words, to perform 
white girlhood. 
 Everyone around Claudia seems to agree that the white baby doll, like Shirley 
Temple, represents an ideal of childhood: “adults, older girls, shops, magazines, 
newspapers, window signs—all the world had agreed that a blue-eyed, yellow-haired, 
pink-skinned doll was what every girl child treasured.” And she knows “from the 
clucking sounds of adults,” that she is supposed to treasure it too, “that the doll 
represented what they thought was my fondest wish.”183 But Claudia resists this script. 
She has “no interest in babies or the concept of motherhood,” and she finds the dolls 
repulsive. (She is particularly revolted by Raggedy Ann dolls, whose “round moronic 
eyes,” “pancake face, and orangeworms hair” frighten her.) She complains that her doll 
turns out to be “a most uncomfortable, patently aggressive sleeping companion”: “When 
I took it to bed, its hard unyielding limbs resisted my flesh—the tapered fingertips on 
those dimpled hands scratched. If, in sleep, I turned, the bone-cold head collided with my 
own.”184 Claudia cannot quite figure out how to treasure the white baby doll the way she 
is expected to, the way the adults and girls around her do. 
 And so she dismembers it instead: 
Break off the tiny fingers, bend the flat feet, loosen the hair, twist the head 
around, and the thing made one sound—a sound they said was the sweet and 
plaintive cry ‘Mama,’ but which sounded to me like the bleat of a dying lamb, or, 
more precisely, our icebox door opening on rusty hinges in July. Remove the cold 
and stupid eyeball, it would bleat still, ‘Ahhhhhh,’ take off the head, shake out the 
sawdust, crack the black against the brass bed rail, it would bleat still. The gauze 
back would split, and I could see the disk with six holes, the secret of the sound. 
A mere metal roundness.185 
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As Claudia destroys the doll, she imagines what it would be like to do the same to “all the 
Shirley Temples of the world,” to transfer the the impulse of “disinterested violence” to 
actual white bodies.186 She knows, however, that if she were to pinch them, “their cry 
would not be the sound of an icebox door, but a fascinating cry of pain.”187 Claudia lives 
in a world where this sort of violence is directed at children like her and children like 
Emmett Till, where black bodies are imagined to be unfeeling and inhuman. The image 
of Claudia dismembering the baby doll represents a sort of parodic reenactment of this 
violence: she returns the brutality directed at black children onto the white doll, a body 
that is actually unfeeling and actually inhuman. 
By disemboweling the white baby doll, by bending its feet and shaking out the 
sawdust and finding the source of its cry, Claudia attempts to discover what makes it 
special: “to see of what it was made, to discover the dearness, to find the beauty, the 
desirability that had escaped me, but apparently only me.”188 If she cannot love it then at 
least she can “examine it to see what it was that all the world said was lovable”—to 
understand why people looked at Shirley Temple and said “‘Awwwww,’ but not for 
[her].”189 In the end, Claudia finds nothing in the baby doll to justify its “dearness.” It is 
gauze and plastic and sawdust, and its cry originates from a constructed, pre-programmed 
disk, “a mere metal roundness.” Morrison makes a similar point about white childhood: 
there is nothing substantive, nothing real or material or viable, to support its claim to 
superiority.  
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Importantly, Morrison also works to re-racialize whiteness. If whiteness derives 
its power from appearing to be unmarked, then white constructions of childhood derive 
their power from appearing unraced: white children are normative, or “‘just’ human,” 
whereas black children “are something else.”190 Little Eva is “just” a child, a standard of 
innocence and vulnerability, whereas Topsy is “something else.” But Claudia understands 
whiteness to be a marked racial experience, the thing that allows Shirley Temple to dance 
with Bojangles but not her, that makes people say “‘Awwwww’” for Temple but not for 
her. She understands that whiteness is tangible and real, a baby doll that she can hold in 
her hands and take apart and destroy, at the same time that it is fraudulent, a “mere metal 
roundness” with no substance or specialness. By cracking open the baby doll and finding 
its “dearness” to be counterfeit, Claudia reclaims her own identity as a black girl. And by 
unmasking and disrupting the white supremacist underpinnings of dominant 
constructions of childhood—what makes some children “cu-ute” but not others—
Morrison creates space for herself to write child characters who are complicated and 
compelling and whose blackness is compatible with their childhood. 
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Conclusion 
 
 When 17-year-old Trayvon Martin was shot and killed by George Zimmerman in 
February, 2012, his death immediately inspired references to Billie Holiday’s “Strange 
Fruit.” The 1939 song imagines a haunting landscape of lynchings: “Southern trees bear a 
strange fruit/Blood on the leaves and blood at the root/Black bodies swingin’ in the 
Southern breeze/Strange fruit hangin’ from the poplar trees.” These references locate 
Martin’s death in a protracted tradition of racist violence in America. They remind us, as 
Jelani Cobb writes, that “history is interred in the shallowest of graves.”191 Indeed, 
Martin’s death has also inspired comparisons to Emmett Till’s. Both boys, black and 
teenaged, walked into a market to buy candy and both wound up dead. Both became child 
casualties of a system beyond their control, martyrs for those concerned about the very 
real and very devastating consequences of American racism. Martin’s childhood 
innocence, like Till’s, was eclipsed by presumptions of his guilt. 
 The murders of Emmett Till, Trayvon Martin, and Tamir Rice are not anomalies. 
They are manifestations of the systematic exclusion of black children from the 
protections of childhood. In a 2014 report for the American Psychological Association, 
researchers found that black boys as young as 10 were significantly less likely to be 
viewed as children than their white counterparts. The report’s subjects—police officers, 
mostly white men, and undergraduate students, mostly white women—consistently 
overestimated the age of the black boys. And when asked to rate the innocence of 
children given their photographs, subjects deemed black children less innocent than white 
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children.192 The practical implications of this assumption are devastating. In the U.S. 
criminal justice system black children are 18 times more likely than white children to be 
sentenced as adults and represent 58 percent of children sentenced to adult facilities. 
Relative to their peers sentenced to juvenile facilities, these children “are twice as likely 
to be assaulted by a correctional officer, five times as likely to be sexually assaulted, and 
eight times as likely to commit suicide.”193 Black children are presumed to be guilty, and 
are held responsible for actions they did or did not commit, at an age when white children 
still benefit from the assumption that they are naturally, essentially, innocent. Black and 
white children share custody of youth but not of childhood. 
 These injustices—presumptions of black childhood guilt in criminal courts, in 
markets in Money, Mississippi and gated communities in Sanford, Florida—are the result 
of a centuries-long process whereby black children have been constructed out of 
childhood. They are the “blood on the leaves” that bespeak the “blood at the root.” 
Indeed, when, in the mid-nineteenth century, the very idea of childhood innocence first 
coalesced, it was unmistakably raced white. While Stowe argued for Topsy’s essential 
childhood, she also helped to institutionalize white sentimental innocence through the 
character of Eva. To be innocent in American culture was to be innocent of race, to 
appear to slip between and beyond social categories. This ability was reserved for white 
children, for the Little Evas and the Shirley Temples, whose childhood innocence 
appeared natural and unraced because their whiteness was unmarked. 
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 By the turn of the twentieth century, popular culture had consolidated sentimental 
innocence into a white supremacist ideology of childhood that excluded black children. If 
childhood innocence was inextricable from vulnerability, then black children’s alleged 
inability to suffer from pain was what disqualified them from childhood in the national 
imagination. To be young and white was to be a child, but to be a young and black was to 
be something else: a nonchild, an insentient pickaninny. Ironically, the pain endured by 
actual black children, by Emmett Till and Tamir Rice and Trayvon Martin, was directed 
at them precisely because their bodies were libeled unfeeling and invulnerable, because 
they were removed from the protections of childhood. 
The fact that, over half a century later, Morrison turned to childhood as a site of 
resistance is not accidental: she understood what was at stake in racist constructions of 
childhood that excluded black children. Her child characters bend and sometimes break 
under a system that deems their childhood unsacred. By centering the subjectivities of her 
black girls and by marking whiteness as a racial experience, Morrison disrupts the 
assumption that to be white is to be “just” human or “just” a child while to be black is to 
be something else. She works to include black children in the protections of childhood by 
laying bare the process by which they were excluded in the first place. 
The killings of Martin and Rice remind us that this process is still very much 
underway. Reflecting on George Zimmerman’s acquittal, Ta-Nehisi Coates concluded, 
“Trayvon Martin is not a miscarriage of American justice, but American justice itself. 
This is not our system malfunctioning. It is our system working as intended.”194 The 
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justice system that failed Martin was never meant to protect him. And the childhood that 
Martin was stripped of was never meant to protect him either. There is blood at the roots.  
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